

Service Differentiation in the Internet for All

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Delay

□ Causes of delay

- Propagation time in space
- Limited available communication capacity
- Storage in intermediate nodes (also a means to reduce delay)

□ Application-specific requirements for delay

- 100 ms of round-trip delay for a human conversation
- 1 night to backup a dataset

□ Internet handling of delay

- Single best-effort service
- Alternatives with service differentiation


Past visions of service differentiation

□ IntServ (Integrated Services)


- Performance guarantees for end-to-end flows
 - Delay and throughput
- High complexity

□ DiffServ (Differentiated Services)

- Reduced complexity
- Performance guarantees for classes of flow




No end-to-end deployment



This is not an Internet. (© Magritte)

Internet of multiple stakeholders



legacy network



adopting network




legacy user



adopting user

- Networks with different economic interests
- Ineffective service differentiation under partial deployment
- Differentiated charging for non-differentiated delay?


RD (Rate-Delay) network services



- ❑ Differentiation with free choice between two services
- ❑ R (Rate) service of higher throughput
- ❑ D (Delay) service of lower delay
- ❑ Router implementation via link scheduling and buffer sizing


Effective service differentiation without different prices

Current economy of Internet connectivity




- ❑ Single best-effort service
- ❑ Delay reduction
 - By higher capacity
 - Due to flatter structure
- ❑ Diversification
 - Specialized ISPs (Internet Service Providers): access, content, transit
 - Interconnections: transit, peering, paid peering

Transit




- ❑ The customer pays the provider for reaching the global Internet
- ❑ Billing depends on bidirectional traffic
- ❑ $f()$ is a pricing function

Settlement-free peering




- ❑ Bilateral exchanges of own customer traffic P
- ❑ Reciprocity as the only compensation for the service
- ❑ Smaller transit traffic for ISPs Y and Z

Paid peering



- ❑ Bilateral exchanges of own customer traffic P
- ❑ Compensation by reciprocity and **monetary payments**
- ❑ Imbalance of costs and market power (e.g., access vs. content ISPs)
- ❑ Pricing mostly unknown

T4P (Transit for Peering)



- ❑ Bilateral exchanges of own customer traffic P
- ❑ Compensation by reciprocity and provision of transit services for some traffic T
- ❑ Reduction in the combined transit costs of ISPs Y and Z

Interconnection innovations reduce costs

Concluding thoughts

- ❑ Delay has value and cost
 - Protocol costs of service differentiation are low
- ❑ Delay as a basis for economic and political tussles
 - Network neutrality vs. paid prioritization
- ❑ Uncertainty about the future: Internet vs. Internets
 - Economies of scale, network effect, ...
 - “National” Internets, application-specific Internets, ...
 - Economic efficiency vs. security vs. human rights